Recent intrusions affecting water and wastewater systems highlight a wider problem that extends beyond utilities: many organizations do not have a single accountable owner for the full network environment they depend on.
In critical infrastructure, municipal services, healthcare, manufacturing, transportation, energy, retail, and financial services, business-critical systems often sit outside traditional IT visibility. They may be connected through cellular modems, vendor-managed links, building systems, legacy operational networks, or third-party platforms. If those assets are not inventoried, governed, segmented, and monitored, they can become unmanaged paths into essential operations.
Key point: The most urgent issue is not only technical exposure. It is fragmented ownership. If no one owns the whole network, no one can reliably protect it.
What recent water-sector incidents reveal
In July, CISA reported malicious activity targeting the operational technology of more than 100 water and wastewater entities. Many of the affected systems were reportedly reachable through controllers connected directly to cellular modems. Additional reporting indicated that utilities in at least seven states had notified federal authorities of incidents during the same period, while other accounts suggested broader geographic impact.
The operational consequences were not theoretical. Reported effects included loss of visibility and, in some cases, loss of function. In one Georgia county, a pump station failed overnight, contributing to a boil-water advisory that was lifted the next day. The responsible authority later stated that unauthorized cyber activity may have caused or contributed to the disruption.
No single public attribution should distract from the core lesson. Whether the attacker is criminal, state-aligned, opportunistic, or simply scanning exposed infrastructure, the weakness is the same: critical equipment was reachable through pathways that many organizations would not find in a standard internal network scan.
The exposure standard network scans miss
Many organizations believe they have already separated operational environments from enterprise IT. In some cases, that is true. Treatment plants, production lines, building automation systems, physical security platforms, and industrial controllers may have been placed on separate networks years ago.
But separation on paper does not protect assets that were never part of the scanned network in the first place.
A controller connected through a public cellular modem may not appear in IT asset management, vulnerability scanning, configuration management, or security monitoring tools. It may have been installed years earlier by an integrator, facilities team, engineering contractor, or operational vendor. It may be paid for through a utility, facilities, public works, operations, or department-level budget rather than central IT.
The practical place to start is often not a scanner. It is finance.
Carrier invoices list SIMs, lines, and services the organization is paying for. Matching 12 months of cellular invoices against actual devices, physical sites, owners, and business functions can quickly identify unknown or forgotten connections.
This principle applies well beyond water utilities:
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Healthcare organizations may find cellular-connected medical systems or facilities equipment.
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Manufacturers may discover remote maintenance modems on production assets.
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Retailers may uncover payment, signage, or building systems connected outside central IT.
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Transportation and logistics operators may find tracking, telemetry, or depot systems on unmanaged links.
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Public-sector entities may have cameras, card readers, traffic systems, or emergency communications equipment treated as infrastructure rather than cyber assets.
Security implication: If a device can affect operations, safety, service delivery, customer trust, or regulatory posture, it belongs in the cybersecurity governance model regardless of which department bought it.
Fragmented ownership creates operational risk
In many cities, utilities, and large enterprises, operational systems sit outside the IT department’s formal control. Public works may own plant equipment. Facilities may own cameras, access control, HVAC, and building automation. Business units may own specialized platforms. Vendors may manage remote access. Finance may track recurring connectivity costs. Cybersecurity may be expected to defend all of it without full authority or visibility.
This creates a familiar failure pattern:
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No single team has a complete asset inventory.
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Network diagrams are outdated or incomplete.
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Vendor-installed connectivity is not reviewed by security.
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Cellular links and remote access paths are not centrally governed.
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Legacy operational systems are excluded from enterprise security standards.
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Knowledge resides with one engineer or administrator and disappears when that person leaves.
For CISOs and CIOs, the governance issue is clear: shared infrastructure requires named accountability. Someone must be responsible for every connected device and every path into systems that support critical services.
This does not mean central IT must operate every asset. It means the organization must define who owns the risk, who approves connectivity, who maintains the inventory, who enforces segmentation, who reviews vendor access, and who reports incidents.
Reporting rules may not capture the real risk
Incident reporting obligations often focus on personal data breaches, ransomware, or defined categories of covered cyber incidents. That leaves gaps.
A cyber event that disrupts a controller, pump, production system, traffic device, building system, or clinical support function may not involve personal information. It may not involve ransomware. Yet it can still affect public safety, business continuity, service availability, regulatory exposure, and executive accountability.
For regulated and operationally critical organizations, this is a governance concern. Legal reporting thresholds are not the same as internal escalation thresholds.
Organizations should define internal cyber incident criteria that include:
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Loss of visibility into operational systems.
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Unauthorized access to controllers, industrial assets, or facility systems.
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Disruption of service delivery or safety-related processes.
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Unapproved remote access into critical environments.
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Discovery of internet-facing or cellular-connected assets not in inventory.
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Evidence of manipulation, attempted manipulation, or loss of control.
Decision point: If an event can affect critical services, it should be escalated even if it does not clearly trigger a statutory reporting requirement.
Funding is often a governance problem, not only a budget problem
Cybersecurity leaders frequently hear that there is no budget for segmentation, asset discovery, or operational hardening. In practice, the issue is often how funds are classified, requested, and justified.
Critical infrastructure organizations may already apply for state, federal, sector-specific, or resilience-related funding. Some funding programs now include cybersecurity criteria, such as whether a governing body has adopted a cybersecurity awareness plan or whether a project remediates deficiencies identified in a cybersecurity assessment. Even modest scoring advantages can matter in competitive funding processes.
For enterprise environments, the equivalent may be capital planning, operational resilience budgets, regulatory remediation programs, audit findings, insurance-driven improvements, merger integration, cloud transformation, plant modernization, or business continuity investment.
The lesson is practical: cybersecurity controls tied to measurable operational risk are easier to fund when they are connected to existing business processes.
Useful funding narratives include:
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Protecting service continuity and avoiding operational disruption.
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Reducing exposure from unmanaged remote access and public connectivity.
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Addressing audit, regulatory, or insurance findings.
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Improving resilience of critical services without replacing core systems.
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Demonstrating visible risk reduction to executives, boards, and regulators.
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Supporting safe modernization of legacy and operational environments.
Why segmentation and microsegmentation matter
Network segmentation remains one of the most effective controls for limiting the impact of compromise. In operational environments, however, many leaders hesitate to enforce segmentation because they fear disrupting plant operations, clinical workflows, production lines, logistics systems, or customer-facing platforms.
That concern is legitimate. Poorly planned segmentation can break dependencies that no one documented.
The answer is not to avoid segmentation. It is to implement it carefully.
A practical approach is to observe and simulate before enforcing controls. Organizations should understand which systems communicate, which connections are necessary, and which are legacy, risky, or unnecessary. Once validated, access rules can be applied so that devices communicate only with approved systems.
For example, a plant controller should communicate only with the supervisory control system or other explicitly required services. It should not have broad access to municipal networks, office systems, payment platforms, guest Wi-Fi, building systems, or unrelated internal applications.
The same logic applies across sectors:
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Medical devices should not have unnecessary access to administrative networks.
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Manufacturing controllers should not communicate broadly with corporate IT.
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Payment systems should be isolated from general-purpose endpoints.
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Building access systems should not be treated as ordinary office devices.
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Cloud workloads should communicate only through approved paths and identities.
Practical takeaway: Segmentation is not merely a network architecture exercise. It is a resilience control that limits blast radius when prevention fails.
Where cybersecurity leaders should start
Organizations do not need to wait for a major grant, a multi-year transformation program, or a complete technology refresh to reduce risk. Several high-value actions can begin immediately.
- Name an accountable owner
Assign one role accountable for the full network environment, including operational systems, cellular links, vendor access, facilities technology, and unmanaged infrastructure. Put that accountability in writing.
- Reconcile carrier invoices with real assets
Review at least 12 months of cellular and connectivity invoices. Map every SIM, modem, line, and recurring service to a device, location, business owner, vendor, and operational purpose.
- Identify critical service dependencies
Prioritize systems that affect public safety, patient care, production continuity, payment processing, logistics, customer access, utilities, or regulated services.
- Validate segmentation before enforcement
Monitor traffic, document required flows, simulate policy impact, and then restrict communications to what is explicitly needed.
- Govern vendor and remote access
Require approved access paths, strong identity controls, logging, time-bound access, and documented ownership for any third-party connection.
- Align cybersecurity with funding cycles
Review grant criteria, capital planning timelines, resilience programs, audit remediation plans, and operating budgets. Position segmentation and asset visibility as business continuity investments, not isolated security tools.
- Create internal escalation triggers
Define operational cyber events that must be escalated even when they do not involve ransomware or personal data.
Executive accountability starts with visibility
Cybersecurity leaders cannot protect assets they cannot see, and executives cannot govern risks that no one owns. The July water-sector incidents reinforce a broader truth for every critical or regulated environment: unmanaged connectivity creates unmanaged risk.
The most important first steps are not exotic. Assign accountability. Find every connected asset. Reconcile what finance pays for with what operations uses. Segment critical systems based on validated communication patterns. Build reporting and funding processes around operational impact.
For boards, executives, CISOs, and public leaders, the message is straightforward: cyber resilience depends on knowing what is connected, who owns it, how it communicates, and what happens if it fails. That level of visibility is now a basic requirement for protecting critical services and maintaining public trust.